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During the last years, we witnessed a gradual decline of bank’s assets quality. One of the best 
tools used in order to estimate the economy state of health is the level of non performing loans 
(hereinafter, NPLs). The first part of this study is focused on the Italian banking system and the 
results are consistent with the existent literature (Greece, Spain, etc.) showing an important 
impact of GDP, unemployment rate, size and solvency variables. The second section 
investigates on the impact of the crisis without any remarkable finding. The last one identifies 
big banks as more affected by NPLs level. 
 






As explained by Beck, Jakubik and Piloiu in the European Central Bank paper of 2013, it’s 
known that level and ratio of deteriorated credits depend of economic cycles. However, this 
degeneration has been inconstant over the Eurozone countries: an analysis on macroeconomic 
and microeconomic factors that led the proliferation of these non performing loans might better 
specify this irregular path. The information regarding the former are often taken into 
consideration as key measure of credit risk (Jakubik e Sutton 2011) which is often correlated 
with a poor banking system performance: given its importance in the global economy, the loan 
quality may be taken as a good proxy of the business cycles (Quagliariello 2007). 
The NPLs are defined as “loans not held for trading that are past due by three months and/or as 
loans, with no collateral considered, characterized by a debtor who is likely to default and hence 
not able to pay back the credit obligations in spite of any past-due amount” (European Central 
Bank 2016). Anyways, it does not necessary mean that all the value is going to be completely 
lost once a loan is defined as non performing: in the first case, the recovery ratio might be 
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slightly higher than 0% or even 100% if the collateral involved is enough capacious to cover 
the total debt value; in the second one, the debtor’s status may change during the time and the 
considered loss may not emerge. As stated before, this type of credits is physiological. The 
problem occurs when the level of NPLs exceeds a certain amount preventing banks to earn 
profits, providing new loans and hence new credit injections to companies. The above 
mentioned mechanism makes the economy entering a vicious circle if spread on a large scale 
over many banks and many banking systems: a conspicuous number of credit defaults reduces 
the available loans, decreasing the consumption.  
The decision of studying the Italian banking system derives from the incredible level of NPLs 
compared to other European countries (€198 billions, more than three times the European 
average): the higher risk attributed by the market already halved the market capitalization of 
the sector. Furthermore, given that 33% of the total NPLs of the Eurozone refers to Italy (as 
revealed by a recent analysis performed by Unicredit), the fact that the market goes short on 
Italian bank equities should not surprise. 
This study, partially follows the research conducted by Louzis, Vouldis and Metaxas on the 
Greek bank system who used annual data of the nine biggest banks from the first quarter of 
2003 until the third one of 2009. Differently from them, the data set employed is unbalanced 
and made of annual observations. While they divided the sample in mortgages, business and 
consumer loans, this research does not differentiate among different loan typologies but among 
different time periods and sizes. The Italian banking sector has been observed by Quagliarello 
between the 1985 and 2002 through an analysis on banks’ behaviour and economic trend. 
The paper is split as follows: the first part presents an overview over the past literature and the 
factors taken in consideration; the second section describes in details the dataset used and the 
econometric model applied to the latter. The following one shows the results of the research 
while the last part concludes and summarize the main findings. 
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2. Literature Review 
The focus of this paper is on four main topics: geographical area, macroeconomic environment, 
banking system characteristics and econometric model. This is neither the first analysis based 
on the Italian banking system (Quagliarello performed different studies before), nor the first 
one that takes into consideration macroeconomic variables (the past literature is overflowing). 
In addition, microeconomic analysis and the use of data panel have already been studied 
(Louzis, Vouldis e Metaxas 2011). However, to our best knowledge, there is not any study that 
meet all of the four criteria together. 
The first part of the literature review is focused on past works based on country specifications, 
the second one on previous researches concerning macroeconomic factors explaining briefly 
each of them; the last one is based on the key bank specifications previously studied. 
 
2.1 Country specifications 
 
The major part of the past literature bases itself on country specifications. For instance, Salas 
and Saurina (2002) deeply analysed loan related issue affecting commercial and savings banks 
in Spain, finding that credit risk is mainly associated with individual microeconomic factors, 
such as bank size, interest margin, capital structure and market size, in addition to real GDP 
growth. Quagliariello (2007) looked at the Italian banking system analysing banks’ behaviour 
over the economic and business trends. The paper tries to investigate whether losses from 
trouble loans, NPLs and ROA have a cyclical pattern concluding that banks’ riskiness and 
profitability are affected by the evolution of the business cycle. A multivariate co-integration 
framework has been used in order to examine the connection and/or the casualty between 
lending rates and property prices in Hong Kong (Gerlach e Peng 2005). They conclude that 
property prices are determinant in the assessment of banks lending rates while the opposite 
seems not to be true. Moreover, the results indicate that lending rates in Hong Kong were not 
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the sources of the boom and bust cycle of the property market. Recently, the Mexican banking 
sector has been studied with the aim of estimating default frequencies and macroeconomic 
connections (Balvy e Souto 2009). More recently, Louzis, Vouldis and Metaxas (2010) 
examined the determinants of NPLs in the Greek banking sector finding that credit quality 
among Greek banks can be explained mainly by macroeconomic fundamentals and 
management practices (Beck, Jakubik e Piloiu 2013). Italy has been chosen due to the increase 
of non-performing loans during the last years [see Exhibit I]. Moreover, the recent economic 
difficulties of Monte dei Paschi (MPS) that almost drove one of the oldest banks in the world 




2.2 Macroeconomic factors 
The current and past literature is full of macroeconomic analysis pertaining to the NPLs 
evolution. GDP (in different forms), inflation, unemployment rate, real long term interest rates, 
net lending/net borrowing rates, saving rate, sovereign debt, currency exchange rates, etc. have 
been tested over the time. In this study, the main factors taken in consideration are the GDP per 
capita, the unemployment rate, the long term interest rate and the net lending/net borrowing 
balance. 
GDP change has been tested many times and in different forms: Tanaskovic and Jandric (2015), 
for instance, took it into consideration along unemployment rate, interest rates and real estate 
prices when analyzing the economy slowdown that supposedly entails an increase in the number 
of NPLs due to debtors’ difficulties in paying back loans. The evolution of the economic cycle 
(measured by the GDP growth) affects banks return since credits losses undermine banks profits 
reducing the loans concession (Quagliarello e Marcucci 2008). Another study performed by 
Quagliarello the previous year, strengthens this fact: he observed the Italian banking sector 
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between throughout 17 years, analysing banks’ behaviour and economic trend. He verified that 
loans provision and returns follow a cyclic pattern demonstrating the GDP centrality and 
positive correlation while estimating NPLs on a long run. A comparable study (1989-2004) 
focused on the impact of debt, income, inflation and unemployment rate on NPLs has been 
performed showing a negative correlation between income and NPLs and a positive one for all 
the other variables (Rinaldi e Sanchis-Arellano 2006). However, the same study performed 
between the 1998 and the 2004 gave different results (a lower income coefficient) implying that 
an increase in the income level was not sufficient to explain the increase in debt on a short term 
horizon. With similar results, Ozili (2015) explored upward economic trends and noticed that 
banks extend credit lines easier, without conducting deep and further analysis on debtors’ 
quality. The explanations provided differ based on the time horizon: in the short term an 
increase in GDP measured as growth rate should involve a decrease of the NPLs level due to 
the higher income available to creditors and hence an improved capacity of re-payment. 
However, on the long term, a continuous increase of the GDP lowers credit analysis due to the 
favourable climate and encourages people to borrow even when unnecessary or when lacking 
financial stability. The hypothesis of this paper is to prove a positive correlation due to GDP 
measure chosen (GDP per capita). 
A positive correlation characterizes also NPLs and interest rates: for every increase in debt 
values given by a raise in interest rates, there is a boost in NPLs level (Messai e Jouini 2013). 
The same result has been found out by Espinoza and Prasad (2010): low growth rates and high 
interest rates increase the NPLs volume (the study has been run between 1995 and 2008 over 
80 banks among Persian Gulf countries). Based on these assumptions, we expect to confirm 
this correlation.  
Further analysis in the literature pointed out the role of the families and nothing is more 
important that being actively employed in this case: the deregulation of financial markets and 
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improvements in the technology involved in information systems together with the interest rates 
reduction led to higher efficiency, to lower transaction costs and, most important, to an increase 
in credit demand from families (Prasad e Espinoza 2010). The unemployment rate is highly 
correlated with the latter: both are key variables since the delay in payment is often indicative 
while assessing the likeliness to repayment and it can be viewed as a good proxy in measuring 
familiar financial stability (Laeven e Laryea 2009). A higher credit availability might increase 
family’s financial resources and consumption but, at the same time, a high indebtedness may 
have a negative impact on future consumption (Laeven e Laryea 2009). Obviously, in order to 
meet each payment date and to not get insolvent, being employed is crucial: especially when 
committed in loans with a long term horizon such as mortgages, the unexpected loss of job 
undermines the likelihood of repayment. For this reason, a positive correlation between 
unemployment rate and NPLs level is expected. Rinaldi and Sanches-Arellano while analysing 
the roots of the non performing loans in the household’s sector, found an interesting correlation 
between NPLs and net lending rate. The same variable has been studied by Louzis, Vouldis and 
Metaxas and it might be seen as a hybrid between macro and micro environments since the 
lending policy is not always driven just by the risk attitude of the banks (it is often distorted by 
internal incentives). Consequently, with an increase of NPLs, the bank system may cut loan 
concession off, decreasing liquidity and hence lowering the consumption impacting the overall 
economy level. The expected correlation of this variable is supposed to be positive considering 
the chosen measure of NPLs. 
Besides the choice of these four variables, the literature presents many more analysis. Louzis, 
Vouldis and Metaxas considered the sovereign debt as a key factor: in this work, it has not been 
considered since it seems to be more appropriate for the Greek situation rather than for the 
Italian one. Another not often considered variable is the exchange currency rate. However, there 
is a reason if it is not mentioned in most of the analysis and researches on the topic: its variation 
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is not statistically significant when compared with the other variables (Buncic e Melecky 2012). 
This is given by the double effect on the depreciation since the positive one related to the 
income is offset by the negative one related to the balance of payments. A weaker currency 
should have a positive impact as a result of an increasing export and hence of a stronger 
repayment capacity from debtors. This scenario is likely to change during a financial instability 
period: the same debts might increase considerably.  
Inflation has been often considered through many papers. As stated by Nkusu in a study from 
the 2011 performed on 26 different economies from the 1998 to the 2009, the inflation rate 
might have either a positive or a negative impact on the debtors’ capacity to pay back their 
obligations. From one hand, it can lower the debt value “helping” borrowers’ situations; from 
the other hand, inflation is also likely to reduce the income when wages are not adjusted by it. 
Furthermore, Buncic and Melecky proved that its increase leads to a higher NPLs level. 
However, in contrast with this analysis, an analogous one presented by Makri, Tsagkanos and 
Bellas in the 2014 on 14 different countries within the Eurozone between the 2000 and the 
2008, shows that the inflation rate does not affect the NPLs. In this context is hard to clearly 
estimate the variable behaviour, for this reason it has not been taken in consideration. 
 
Table 1: Definition of variables tested. 
Variable Indicator Frequency Measure Hypothesis tested 
Gross Domestic Product GDP Annual Euro per capita (+) 
Unemployment Rate UNEMP Annual Growth rate (+) 
Long Term Interest Rates LTINT Annual Percentage per annum (+) 







2.3 Microeconomic factors 
 
In order to have a more complete understanding of the phenomenon, microeconomic variables 
should be taken into account. Macroeconomic factors are not able to fully explain the NPLs 
development because most of the time the endogenous characteristics of the banking system 
such as cost structure, risk management and/or resources allocation, play a critical role 
influencing the general economy. In the 1997, Berger and DeYoung pointed out the impact of 
bank characteristics such as “bad luck”, “bad management”, “skimping” and “moral hazard”. 
These factors are often a bad signal which amplifies the negative effect of the additional costs 
(entailed by the overdue credits) on the banking cost efficiency. In this paper, return on equity 
(ROE), inefficiency, solvency (which correspond respectively to bad management, skimping 
and moral hazard hypothesis), size, leverage and diversification have been included in the 
analysis.  
The bad luck hypothesis is founded on external occurrences that impact banks loans. The 
relation between these events and the related costs is particular since the majority of the duties 
occur some time after the loans get overdue: these costs will lower the cost efficiency just in 
appearance because even the most efficient banks will have to deal with an increase of expenses 
related to NPLs. Given the nature of this variable and the aim of this research, it has not been 
further considered. 
The difference between bad luck and bad management is essentially the timing. In this case, 
the increase in costs and the following decrease of cost efficiency take place before the raise in 
NPLs since the latter is the direct consequence of the bad management. The hypothesis was 
calculated with the analysis of the ROE and it is supposed to be negatively correlated with 
NPLs.  
Skimping hypothesis has a similar pattern, meaning that the timing is the same as for the bad 
management; the revealing signal is opposite though (high cost efficiency due to the unequal 
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resource allocation). Under these assumptions, the management is driven by the desire of a 
short term high cost efficiency to the detriment of a long run good performance: the bank 
appears to be efficient because of the low expenses addressed to underwriting and monitoring 
loans. The ratio between operating expenses and operating income has been chosen and 
following what just mentioned above, it is supposed to have a positive correlation. 
The last hypothesis taken in consideration by Berger and DeYoung is the moral hazard which 
implies an excessive risk-taking strategy when another part is involved and holds up the risk. It 
usually happens in banks with “limited” capital when a loss is suffered: this encourages the 
bank to increase the riskiness of its assets. This hypothesis is not strictly correlated with cost 
efficiency but still explanatory since it gives a solid alternative reason to the increase of NPLs 
and it emphasizes the effects of the three previous hypothesis (Berger e DeYoung 1997). In 
order to capture this variable, the ratio between Tier1 and total assets has been used: the 
expected correlation is negative. 
Beside the ones given by Berger and DeYoung, Louzis et al. formulated four more hypotheses: 
“diversification”, “too big to fail”, “procyclical credit policy” and “tight control”. Only the first 
two have been considered.  
The first one takes into consideration banks’ diversification since it can easily be connected 
with loan quality. Most of the previous literature considered the bank size as a good proxy for 
diversification since a big size is supposed to increase the range of hedging opportunities (Salas 
e Saurina 2002). However, the non-interest income might be used as a better approximation in 
light of the fact that it can be seen as the management capacity to confide in different income 
streams: for this hypothesis a ratio between net interest income and not-interest income has 
been used. The correlation is expected to be positive. 
Related with the moral hazard one, the authors developed the “too big to fail” hypothesis which 
finds its roots in loose governmental policies that allow big banks to take excessive risk. If 
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Boyd and Gertler (1994) found positive acknowledgement about the topic, Ennis and Malek 
(2005) were not able to confirm this theory with absolute certainty. This hypothesis has a better 
fit with the size variable compared to the diversification one; for this reason, in order to catch 
the significance, it has been decided to use the total assets value as good estimator with an 
expected positive correlation sign. 
The procyclical credit policy specification is based on the bank attempt to hide losses in the 
short term, in order to not affect the earnings, through different practices such as lending new 
money or extending deadlines to “problematic” borrowers (Rajan 1994).  
The ownership dispersion is the last variable taken in consideration. A high ownership 
concentration is expected to decrease the NPLs level since all the risk is bore just by one subject 
which is supposed to be less willing to take huge risks compared to a situation in which the 
ownership (and then the risks) are divided by several subjects (Berle e Means 1932). None of 
the last two were considered due to different reason: in the first case it has been hard to evaluate 
a correct estimator. Louzis et al. used the ROE value which seems to be too simple though. In 
order to use this factor, a better understanding of the balance sheet has to be done.  
In the second case, the Italian frame is not the most appropriate context where to perform such 
an analysis. First of all, the company structure is highly fragmented and it would be too difficult 
and vague to estimate a justifiable threshold. For instance, taking in consideration just the four 
biggest bank, there are not shareholders with a stake over the 10%. In details, Unicredit has a 
Aalbar Luxembourg and BlackRock as major shareholders with a 5% respectively. Intesa San 
Paolo boasts “Compagnia San Paolo” as primary shareholder with a 9,8% stake. UBI Banca 
presents Silchester International Investors with a 5% stake and Monte dei Paschi di Siena shows 
the Italian Financing Ministry as main shareholder (5%).  
On the top of these criteria, a further hypothesis has been tested: in order to understand how the 
leverage of each bank affects the bad loans, the ratio between total assets and total liabilities 
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has been analysed. The expected correlation is supposed to be negative as the increase in assets 
(or the decrease in liabilities) drives the leverage down. 
 
Table 2: Definition of tested variables. 
Variable Indicator Frequency Measure Hypothesis tested 
Inefficiency INEFF Annual 𝑂𝑝. 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑂𝑝. 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 (+) 
Size SIZE Annual 𝑇𝑜𝑡. 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 (+) 
Diversification DIV Annual 𝐼𝑛𝑡. 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑁𝑜𝑛	𝐼𝑛𝑡. 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 (-) 
Leverage LEV Annual 𝑇𝑜𝑡. 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑇𝑜𝑡. 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏. (-) 
ROE% ROE% Annual 𝑅𝑂𝐸 (-) 




3. Italian Context 
 
The Italian environment is heavily affected by its economy which still struggles to recover. The 
government held by Gentiloni is trying to implement fiscal and monetary policies in order to 
foster the growth; anyways, inflation, weak euro and unemployment rate will be determinant. 
One of the main issue nowadays is the low demand coming from exports. The internal one is 
fortunately balancing the external one but for a country got famous for its “made in Italy” the 
situation is quite “heavy”. The improvements in labour condition, negotiated recently by 
unions, and the higher household’s disposable income, increased families’ consumption.  
Regarding the main macroeconomic values (see Chart 1), the real GDP grew by 0.83% in the 
2016 and is expected to growth up to 1.03% in the 2018. The Inflation has been stable between 
the 2003 and the 2012, while it dropped afterwards due to the fall in energy prices. It has been 
negative during the last year but it is forecasted to increase at 1.1% in the 2017. 
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The unemployment rate has been stable around the 8% until the 2011, then it rapidly increased 
up to 11.7%; it is expected to decrease at 11.3% during this year however, it’s higher than the 
average for the European countries. The household disposable income witnessed an increase in 
the last 3 years, setting its annual growth rate at 1.31%. At the same time, the household debt 
shows a decrease for the last 4 available years (not the 2016); however, it is still incredibly high 
if compared to the level of 10 years ago (66.2% of net disposable income compared to 89.2% 
of the 2015). If some macroeconomic values seem to start undertaking a positive path, the 
government debt set a record level in the 2016: it stands at 157.35% of the GPD, with a deficit 
of -2% [see Exhibit II]. 
Regarding the current Italian account surplus, it is expected to be set around 2%, higher than 
the European average. The investments are also expected to increase due to the ECB measures, 
taken with the aim to improve the overall credit accessibility in Italy. 
In spite of these reassuring news, the Italian economic system is far to be recovered: the 
Constitutional Referendum of the last December made former Prime Minister Matteo Renzi 
resign, putting the Italian political environment in a context of total instability.  
The banking system is going through some rough waters as well. According to the report 
“Italian banking sector: recent developments and reforms” published by the Ministry of the 
Economy and Finance in the 2016, the level of net NPLs hit the incredible amount of €198 
billion, above the average level of other European countries. However, the aggregate value of 
NPLs has to be weight with the rates of debtor-collateral coverage which are higher in Italy 
rather than in other European countries. 
In order to solve this problem, the Government intervened with several reforms on the 
governance and the structure of the Italian banking system. It has introduced GACS (Guarantee 
on Securitisation of Non-Performing Loans), the Atlante Fund and sponsored amendments on 
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bankruptcy aimed to speed up the legal processes and recover NPLs. Furthermore, it has 
implemented benefit regarding tax treatments of bad loans. 
GACS is an instrument that the Ministry has made available to finance and credit operators 
with the aim of increasing the disposal of the non performing loans. The State guarantees only 
the senior debt and the price is settled by the market in order to avoid possible aiding and 
abetting that might affect the competition. At the end of last year, GACS has been able to close 
its first securitization deal with Banca Popolare di Bari. The portfolio comprised retail and 
corporate Bad Loans for a value of almost €480 million, of which €304 were loans mainly 
secured by residential and commercial properties, with the remainder being unsecured.  
Atlante, originally called Alternative Investment Fund, is instead a private equity fund which 
gathers capital from financial institutions such as banks, insurance companies and foundations. 
The goals of this fund are mainly to ensure the success of the capital increases required to banks 
struggling on the market, to boost the NPLs Italian market due to the fact that Atlante will focus 
its investments in the subordinated debt tranches (there is a market for the Senior debt) and to 
offer to the investors high long term returns which will help the banking system, improving the 
overall Italian economy. During July of the last year, Monte dei Paschi di Siena has been 
evaluated as “the most fragile bank in Europe” by the EU. Suddenly after, it announced the plan 
of sale of 27.6 billion of bad loans at less than a third of the value (9.1 billion, equal to the 
32.8% of the book value) which should have been bought by the fund. It did not work out at 
that time, but recently (10th of May 2017) Atlante finally closed it first operation: it bought 2.2 
billion of NPLs from Banca Marche, Banca Etruria and CariChieti as essential condition in 
order to let UBI Banca proceeds with the acquisition of the three aforementioned banks.  
Beside the governmental intervention, in order to increase the profitability, banks are working 
especially on the cost structure: only during the last year, 900 bank branches have been closed 
(to a total of 29,511). Unicredit estimated a possible reduction of the NPL ratio below the 14% 
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of the 2012 (today it is at 18%) only with a stable GDP annual growth rate of 1% given also the 
low interest rates that prevent the financial institutions from a massive increase in interest 
income. 
 




The purpose of this Work Project is to analyse the impact that macroeconomic factors and bank 
specifications had on the NPLs level in Italy. Furthermore, the study wants to explore the causes 
of these impacts, trying to explain the mechanism that brought the Italian banking system to 
this point.  
 
4.1 Research Questions 









GDP (%) Unemployment 
Rate
Deficit Inflation Interest Rate Net Lend/Borr Saving  rate Disposable 
Income
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
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RQ1: Which macroeconomic and microeconomic factors had the greatest impact on the 
non performing loans level in Italy?  
RQ2: Which is the impact of the crisis on this topic? Did the parameters behaved constantly 
before and after the economic crisis that hit Italy in the 2008? 
RQ3: Does the difference in size involve a different effect? Are big banks more capable in 
managing the non performing loans? Or being small entails a relatively low impact?  
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for NPLs of the last three years. 
 2014 2015 2016 
Mean €5.798.000 €4.226.000 €11.847.000 
Median €19.469.000 €16.550.000 €24.194.000 
Max €87.165.000 €77.838.000 €58.137.000 
Min €82.000 €47.000 €22.370.000 
St. Dev 29,262 26,018 24,809 
Skew 1,6071 1,6806 0,6124 
Kurt 1,495 1,526 -1,899 
JB test 6,282 7,948 1,7032 
p-value (0,043) (0,019) (0,427) 
Notes: JB denotes the Jarque-Bera test for normality. 
 
4.2 Data 
Instead of comparing different countries as Nkusu (2011) and Betck et al. (2013), the paper 
focuses only on the Italian banking system due not only to the personal involvement but also to 
the fact that, with regards to bank specifications, the Italian context differs substantially from 
all the others. This decision is explained by the willingness to eliminate potential discrepancies 
among different European systems with regard to both economic and politic factors. In addition, 
only “pure” banks have been evaluated in order to have comparable results especially 
concerning operating income, interest income and non interest income values (for this reason, 
Banca Generali, the most important Italian insurance company, has not been included). In this 
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case, it would be particularly difficult whether to confirm or not some hypothesis such the 
diversification one: under these assumptions, it is easier to capture some results that otherwise 
would have not been clear.  
The NPLs data are presented in absolute values and not in ratio with the total amount of loans. 
The decision has been made in order to differentiate the study from almost the totality of 
previous papers that used the aforementioned ratio and to monitor the supposed different 
behaviour (GDP is negatively correlated with the ratio of NPLs over total loans but it should 
be positive correlated with the absolute NPLs value). 
Banks’ information has been retrieved from Bloomberg and Thompson Reuters (EIKON) while 
the macroeconomic data has been taken from OECD (Organization fro Economic Co-operation 
and Development) database. 
This study covers the following sixteen Italian banks: Intesa San Paolo (ISP), Unicredit (UCG), 
Mediobanca (MB), UBI Banca (UBI), Fineco Bank (FBK), Banca Popolare dell’Emilia 
Romagna (BPE), Banca Popolare di Milano (PMI), Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (BMPS), 
Credem (CE), Banca Popolare di Sondrio (BPSO), Credito Valtellinese (CVAL), Banca Carige 
(CRG), Banca di Desio e Brianza (BDB), Banca Profilo (PRO), Banca Finnat (BFE) and Banco 
di Sardegna(BSRP); data for Banca Popolare were unfortunately unavailable. These banks have 
been chosen for three main reasons: first of all, they are all listed at the primary securities 
market in Italy, the Milan Stock Exchange (in Italian, Borsa Italiana) meaning that all the data 
needed for this analysis are easily accessible. Secondly, since several variables have been 
tested, the sample has to be numerically consistent in terms of observations. Lastly, given the 
third question addressed, in order to compare the two sub-samples split with regard to the size, 
having several banks was absolutely necessary. 
Concerning the timeframe, it spans from the 2004 to the 2016. The decision is based on the fact 
that, in order to capture the impact of the crisis and then to confirm or reject the hypothesis, the 
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sample has to be consistent before the 2009 and after the 2009. Through this arrangement, the 
subsamples are similar in term of years and both greater than 30 (even though the number of 
observations changes drastically due to unavailability of data for certain banks in specific 
years). Furthermore, taking into consideration just the recent years, it might result in unclear 
outcomes given by the possible distortion of the 2008 financial crisis which will not allow the 
study to be complete and comprehensive. Furthermore, because of the nature of the 
methodology, data before the 2004 and of the current year, has been disregarded due to lack of 
availability in the database used. The threshold used to divide the sample based on the size has 
been assessed to be €100.000 in assets which corresponds to the third quartile (consisting in 
Intesa San Paolo, Unicredit, Ubi Banca and Monte dei Paschi di Siena). 
 
4.3 Econometric Framework 
Given the nature of the regressand and its non-linear relationship with the regressors, a log-log 
model for panel data has been used. Logarithmic transformations are often used in order to 
transform highly skewed variables in approximately normal ones such the non performing loans 
case: the use of the logarithm makes the effective relationship non-linear maintaining the linear 
model (Benoit 2011). The use of data panel, instead,  allows to check for variables that change 
over time but not across entities, monitoring for distortions deriving from individual 
heterogeneity and missing factors (Greene 2012). 
Given the unbalanced data panel (the individuals of the data set are observed a different number 
of times, denoted with 𝑇9), the choice of the right model was critical: due to the unobserved 
individual effects (heterogeneity), the Hausman test (1978) has been perform in order to decide 
whether to use fixed or random effects. The null hypothesis is that random effects are preferred 
while the alternative one suggests that fixed effects should be used: it basically tests whether 
the unique errors are correlated with the regressors or not. This test has been run on RStudio 
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and it showed a chi-squared of 19.297 with a significant p-value of 0.02278 which implies the 
rejection of the null hypothesis and the adoption of fixed effects in the model, which set time 
and banks effect with the goal to partially eliminate collinearity problems. In detail, bank fixed 
effects check for constant effects that might influence NPLs for a specific bank while year fixed 
effects keep constant the effects related in a given year that might affect the level of bad loans. 
In general, including fixed effects eliminates possible omitted variable biases (Imai e Kim 
2016). The equation can be written as follow: 
𝑦9,< = 𝑥9,<> 𝛽 + 𝛼9 + 𝜀9,<                             (1)	
where 𝑥9,<>  is the vector of explanatory variables, 𝛼9 = 𝑧,>𝛼 embodies all the observable effects 
specifying an estimable conditional mean and 𝜀9,< is the stochastic error term. 
Furthermore, given the particularity of the sample, namely the lack of data for specific banks 
and the relative small subsamples (namely, pre crisis and big size) a test for the multi 
collinearity has been performed using the variance inflation factor package within RStudio 
(𝑉𝐼𝐹 = 	1 (1 − 𝑅IJ)). This test presents a high correlation between leverage and solvency 
variables (values higher than eight): since leverage has been tested multiple times in previous 
researches and the results are quite clear, it has been preferred to keep the explanatory variable 
for solvency.  
 
4.4 Model Specification 
As previously stated, the regressors are the following: INEFF, SIZE, DIV, LEV, ROE%, 
SOLV, GDP, UNEMP, LTINT and NLNB. A second sequence of regression has been 
considered with explanatory variables for GDP and unemployment rate up to one lag (Exhibit 
IX). The model is presented as the following one: 
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𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑁𝑃𝐿9,< = 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐹𝐹9,<> 𝛽N,<> + log 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸9,<> 𝛽J,<> + log 𝐷𝐼𝑉9,<> 𝛽U,<> + log 𝐿𝐸𝑉9,<> 𝛽V,<>
+ 𝑅𝑂𝐸%9,<> 𝛽X,<> + 𝑆𝑂𝐿𝑉9,<> 𝛽Y,<> + log 𝐺𝐷𝑃9,<> 𝛽[,<> + log 𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃9,<> 𝛽^,<>
+ log 𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑇9,<> 𝛽_,<> + 𝑁𝐿𝑁𝐵9,<> 𝛽Na,<> 																																																																						(2) 
 
For each sample and sub-sample (namely pre crisis, post crisis, big size and small size) 
macroeconomic and microeconomic variables have been tested first separately and then 
together in order to be parsimonious with the number of variables and to catch the difference 
of significance levels. Finally, the Breusch-Pagan test has been performed with the aim to detect 
heteroskedasticity (the variance stays constant for different observations), which has been 
found in several sub-samples: even though cross-sectional models are more likely to be 
interested by it, panel data might be affected as well given also the nature of the values. The 
presence of the latter does not affect estimates of 𝛽9 but rather the standard errors. In order to 
tackle this issue, a robust covariance matrix that is robust to heteroscedasticity in the errors has 
been derived (Greene 2012). 
Further robustness checks have been performed with the goal of getting a deeper understanding 
of the variables. First of all, macroeconomic and microeconomic variables have been tested 
separately in order to catch the impact deprived of other variables “noise”. 
The second robustness check performed involved the use of lag variables with regard to GDP 
and unemployment rate. The base idea is that the two macroeconomic variables have a stronger 





The estimations of the models that explain the development of NPLs due to change in the 
aforementioned explanatory variables are shown in the following table: 
 
Table 4: Results for main models. 
 









 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]  
INEFF 0.00043 0.003085 0.00015 0.00328 0.00021 INEFF 
 [0.00035] [0.00424] [0.000237] [0.00222] [0.00041]  
SIZE 0.66324** 1.44995*** 0.198847 0.65351*** 0.85498 SIZE 
 [0.32793] [0.37946] [0.4821] [0.22694] [0.70886]  
DIV -0.16192 -0.144744 -0.81483* -0.68503*** 0.31706 DIV 
 [0.14283] [0.23719] [0.4416] [0.23485] [0.19096]  
ROE% -0.28008 -0.594083 -0.06580 -0.30350 -0.61126 ROE% 
 [0.33869] [0.977426] [0.21747] [0.28297] [0.53556]  
SOLV -2.11117 24.58804*** 0.664726 15.33724 -1.2176 SOLV 
 [3.25469] [5.35399] [3.94346] [15.66760] [4.84488]  
GDP 5.12753*** 3.361497 4.681425 4.25248*** 5.84917*** GDP 
 [1.51197] [3.76980] [4.21437] [1.50651] [2.05958]  
UNEMP 21.7665*** 32.97039* 32.184379** 19.96231*** 17.18808 UNEMP 
 [6.76128] [16.58389] [14.84532] [6.82526] [10.20001]  
LTINT 2.49946 59.357438 0.078167 3.05891 2.63491 LTINT 
 [4.12055] [48.21316] [3.98860] [3.85786] [5.67127]  
NLNB -6.21770 4.552990 -9.520910 -14.9688*** -2.70753 NLNB 
 [6.29012] [19.038059] [13.96892] [4.67242] [8.99781]  
       
R-sq. 0.59 0.43 0.47 0.88 0.53  
Adj. R-sq. 0.51 -0.09 0.29 0.83 0.42  
Observations 147 51 96 45 102  
 
Note: St. Errors are reported in parenthesis 
*** denotes significance at 1% 
** denotes significance at 5% 
* Denotes significance at 10% 
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First of all, it should be clarified the fact that an explanatory variable without significance does 
not involve a complete lack of significance evidence but rather than the model is not able to 
capture it. 
With respect to macroeconomic variables, as expected, GDP and unemployment rate are 
positively correlated with the increase of non performing loans in almost every scenario. The 
first one confirms the previous studies, playing an important role within the model with one 
substantial difference: the sign. While Beckmann et al. (2012), Louzis et al. and Jakubik and 
Reininger show a negative correlation, the estimation of this model is positive. As previously 
said, the different behavior is basically due to the different “form” of NPLs: it has been used in 
total values while previous researches considered the ratio on the amount of total liabilities.  
It shows that an increase in the GDP per capita leads to an increase in the non performing loans 
and it is perfectly explained by the fact that higher incomes encourage consumption and new 
loans requests, which will automatically increase the level of NPLs. 
Unemployment rate has a significant impact in all the samples taken into consideration 
confirming findings from previous papers such as Louzis et al. and Salas and Saurinas (2012). 
The fact that it has an immediate impact is also quite meaningful for research purposes: it entails 
a strong and quick repercussion on bad loans and should be carefully considered by regulators. 
Long term interest rates cannot be confirmed as significant while the net lending/net borrowing 
hypothesis has a significant impact only in the subsample relative to banks characterized by a 
big size. This variable is measured as difference between loans and deposits as a percentage of 
GDP [see Exhibit X]. A positive value (as for the last years) indicates that big financial 
institutions are more willing to grant loans and probably pay less attention to the actual creditor 
situation. Hence, an increase in the lending rate broadens the pool of borrowers and the amount 
of non performing loans in turn. 
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On the other hand, with respect to the microeconomic explanatory variables, size is significant 
across all the models. This result might be brought back to the net lending/net borrowing one. 
Banks characterized by a big and relevant size have a loose internal control system in providing 
loans.  
Diversification is highly significant up to a certain size [see Exhibit V] while inefficiency and 
ROE do not seem to be that statistically relevant. Bad management and skimping hypothesis 
are then rejected. 
Solvency is characterized by an inconstant path, with a significant impact on NPLs’ level just 
in the years before the 2009 [see Exhibit IV]. Moreover, it was supposed to be negatively 
correlated with the NPLs level while the sign is positive according to the results shown in Table 
4. While the hypothesis, based on the belief that an increase in Tier 1 (and hence a more 
responsible management), would have led to a decrease in non performing loans, the outcomes 
reveal that the higher ratio of Tier 1 over the amount of total assets is likely to be caused by the 
NPLs value of the previous years. The moral hazard hypothesis as previously defined should 
be rejected, hence. 
Overall, macroeconomic variables seem to be fairly constant (especially GDP and 
unemployment rate) across all the models while microeconomic variables vary based on the 
sample taken in consideration. Moreover, as shown in the Exhibits from III to VIII, inefficiency, 
return on equity and solvency result to be much more significant when not “disturbed” by 
macroeconomic variables which are probably somehow affected by GDP and unemployment 
rate.  
The difference between the base model and the “lagged” one [see Exhibit from VI to VIII] 
surprisingly is not really marked; contrary to what expected, the explanatory variables seem to 
be more powerful when taken into consideration on the same year of the response variable. The 
only unemployment rate lag has not been considered due to the fact that it is directly correlated 
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with the GDP of year t and it would have entailed a distortion of the results of the small samples 
models (e.g. pre crisis and big size, weak due to the number of observations). With n equal to 
51 and 45 respectively the use of 10 explanatory variables might seem to be forced since the 
ratio of 8-10 observations every variable would be shattered. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The study used unbalanced panel data to assess macro and micro factors that affect the level of 
NPLs in Italy. Even though the banks included in the sample are part of the same national 
banking system, they quite differentiate from each other especially with respect to size, return 
on equity and diversification of income. ID fixed effect might help capturing these differences 
but the specifications are likely to still affect the responsiveness to changes of variables. The 
model built for this study can be taken in consideration if the aim is to explain macro and micro 
economic processes that influence the Italian banking system. Applied to each individual bank, 
it might not work in the same way, involving room for improvement. 
Overall, the main takeaways of this analysis are the positive confirmation of solvency, 
diversification, GDP and unemployment rate hypothesis and the rejection of inefficiency and 
long term interest rates hypothesis. With regard to the general effect on the level of non 
performing loans, GDP and unemployment rate result highly impacting among macroeconomic 
variables (perfectly in line with the previous literature) while only size and solvency are 
significant among the microeconomic ones. 
The shock caused by the 2008 crisis has not yet been recovered with regards to the non 
performing loans. The difference between the pre-crisis and post-crisis samples suggests that 
nowadays, non performing loans are less responsive to changes in the economic environment 
since evidence of existence of the hypothesis tested are missing.  
Conversely to hypothesised scenario, big banks are more “sensitive” than small ones: the reason 
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lies in the fact that smaller banks are able to manage the number of NPLs in a better way 
(probably due to the limited number) which makes them experiencing a lighter impact. As 
suggested by the results, in order to react better to this huge impact, big banks should pursue 
the diversification in income streams. This would lead to a lower negative effect of losses 
deriving from NPLs. 
This study has some interesting implications in terms of regulation and policy: for instance, it 
suggests that regulators should pay much more attention to the most important and biggest 
banks present in the country. Moreover, labour and GDP growth policies should be fostered 
given the importance that embody in affecting the NPLs level. 
For next researches, it would be advisable to study loans at specification levels (dividing them 
among different categories), in order to understand the determinants of being non performing. 
Furthermore, it might result interesting to add another banking system with a similar structure 
in order to compare the real weight of the bad (or good) management.  
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